Introduction: The Triangulation of International Intellectual Property Law: Cooperation, Power, and Normative Welfare by Gerhart, Peter M.
Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law
Volume 36 | Issue 1
2004
Introduction: The Triangulation of International
Intellectual Property Law: Cooperation, Power, and
Normative Welfare
Peter M. Gerhart
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil
Part of the International Law Commons
This Foreword is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of Case Western
Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Peter M. Gerhart, Introduction: The Triangulation of International Intellectual Property Law: Cooperation, Power, and Normative Welfare,
36 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 1 (2004)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil/vol36/iss1/1
INTRODUCTION: THE TRIANGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: COOPERATION, POWER, AND
NORMATIVE WELFARE
Peter M Gerhartt
The articles appearing in this symposium issue were developed for a
conference held at our law school on March 26, 2004 entitled "The Future
of International Intellectual Property: The International Relations of
Intellectual Property Law." Together with papers delivered at the
conference but published elsewhere, and some work not yet published,' the
day was devoted to exploring the future of international intellectual
property law by attempting to understand the forces that influence it and the
methods by which we determine the welfare effects of the system. The
conference-a follow up to our earlier commitment to this field2 -
consisted of scholars from two related, but distinct traditions-one group
whose primary background has been in international relations theory and
the others whose primary background has been in intellectual property
theory. The intermixture was deliberate, reflecting a belief that each
discipline must rely on insights from the other in order to complete our
understanding of what might lie ahead.
In this introduction, I propose to summarize the broad themes that I
saw emerge from the conference, and to show how the papers presented in
the conference relate to one another. Let me therefore proceed from a
broad, thematic perspective to a narrower one, focusing first on what we
tried to accomplish in the conference, then on what themes came out of the
Professor, Case Western Reserve University School of Law.
Because the conference was conceived to be a conversation among experienced and
thoughtful experts, rather than simply a presentation of papers, participants were given an
opportunity, but were not required, to publish a paper in this symposium issue. In addition
to those whose papers are published here, the following scholars made presentations at the
conference: Ruth Okediji, the William L. Prosser Professor of Law at the University of
Minnesota, Kal Raustalia, Professor of Law at UCLA, Jerome H. Reichman, the Bunyan S.
Womble Professor at Duke Law School (who presented the paper cited infra note 4), Pamela
Samuelson, Professor at Boalt Hall School of Law & Information Management & Systems at
the University of California (who presented her paper Intellectual Property Arbitrage: How
Foreign Rules Can Affect Domestic Protections, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 223 (2004), and Gregory
C. Shaffer, Professor at the University of Wisconsin law school (who, in a work-in-progress
entitled International Law as Power: A Taxonomy, presented an overview of the treatment of
"power" under various approaches to international relations and related them to international
intellectual property law).
2 Peter M. Gerhart, Special Introduction. Reflections: Beyond Compliance Theory--TRIPS
as a Substantive Issue, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 357 (2000).
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conference, and finally on a consideration of how the reader might
understand the individual contributions in light of the overall themes that I
identify.
We initiated this symposium to marry two different analytical
perspectives-the perspective of intellectual property and the perspective of
international relations. Driven by the new technologies of communication
and transportation and the concomitant increase in international diplomacy
over knowledge goods,3 international intellectual property has entered a
period of renewed and sustained vigor.4  The TRIPS agreement
administered through the World Trade Organization (WTO) 5 requires all
members (and those states that want to be members) to enact minimum
standards of intellectual property protection and to set up procedures by
which intellectual property owners can protect their rights. Along with
renewed energy in the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)-
the international organization that has traditionally dealt with transnational
intellectual property issues-the current round of global and regional trade
negotiations seek, paradoxically, both to relax6  and to enhance 7
3 Analysis of international intellectual property in a trade regime is increasingly seen as
relating to the production and distribution of knowledge goods, reflecting that intellectual
property law creates a legal package within which knowledge can be produced, hoarded, and
transferred. See generally, KEITH MASKUS & J.H. REICHMAN (eds.), INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
REGIME (forthcoming 2004)[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY] and PETER DRAHos & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS
THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? (2002).
4 The literature on international intellectual property has grown substantially in the past
ten years. Two perspectives appear to dominate the literature. The rights (or wealth based)
perspective emphasizes intellectual property owners' legitimate claims to compensation for
their contribution to society, the notion of theft or piracy of that property, and the importance
of protecting intellectual property in order to facilitate international trade and investment.
See e.g., ROBERT M. SHERWOOD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT (1990). The
knowledge based perspective sees intellectual property in instrumental terms, and
emphasizes both the need for incentives for the generation of new knowledge and the
limitations on those incentives for those who need access to that knowledge. See e.g., Keith
E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods and the
Privatization of Global Public Goods, 7 J. INT'L ECON L. 279 (2004), Report of the
Commission of Intellectual Property Rights, Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and
Development Policy (2002), available at http://www.iprcommission.org/
graphic/documents/finalreport.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2004). The economic evidence is
collected and analyzed in KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY (2000).
5 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, 33 I.L.M. 81
(1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
6 The current round of WTO multilateral negotiations, the so-called Doha Round, is
exploring ways of improving access to essential medicines within the context of the TRIPS
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international standards. Simultaneously, the international relations field,
freed from the grips of a bi-polar world dominated by major security
competition, is searching for ways to use its considerable set of analytical
tools, themselves reflecting the cohabitation of economics and political
science, to understand how the transnational world works. Although the
marriage between international relations and intellectual property was
natural, and, indeed, inevitable, the couple is coping with the usual
adjustments from any such union-how to meld analytical perspectives that
are complimentary but distinct, how to deal with redundancy when the
cultures overlap (that is, which copy of Moby Dick to keep), and how to
deal with different language (you say tomato and I say tomato). The new
culture generated by the amalgamation of these two perspectives is itself
interesting to watch.
L The Substance/Process Dichotomy
We get a good understanding of the relationship between the
international relations perspective and the international intellectual property
perspective if we examine each perspective along the familiar
substance/process dichotomy. Recognizing that there is no way fully to
separate the substantive or normative dimension of intellectual property
from the procedural issue of how the law is made, we can understand the
relation between the two perspectives if we understand the way that each
perspective approaches the substance/process dichotomy, and then look to
how the mixture of the two allows the two perspectives to work in tandem.
By and large, the core concern of intellectual property scholars who
study international intellectual property is normative. They want to know
how we can permit the broadest possible access to existing knowledge
without undercutting the incentives needed to generate a high rate of new
knowledge. This substantive, normative focus on the appropriate balance
between the incentive effects and the access effects of intellectual property
framework. This is generally understood to constitute a TRIPS-minus agenda, permitting
developing countries to take advantage of the access flexibilities built into TRIPS, and, in
some cases, providing new sources of access. See Peter M. Gerhart, Slow Transformations:
The WTO As a Distributive Organization, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1045 (2002). For an
update on the TRIPS-minus negotiations see Bryan C. Mercurio, TRIPS, Patents, andAccess
to Life-Saving Drugs in the Developing World, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 211 (2004).
7 As our conference papers make clear, the United States has been using bi-lateral and
regional trade agreements to enhance the protection of intellectual property through free
trade agreements with individual or regional trading partners. This agenda is now known as
the TRIPS-plus agenda. See e.g., Peter Drahos, Securing the Future of Intellectual Property:
Intellectual Property Owners and their Nodally Coordinated Enforcement Pyramid, 36 CASE
W. RES. J. INT'L L. 53 (2005) and Carlos M. Correa, Bilateralism in Intellectual Property:
Defeating the WTO System for Access to Medicines, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 79 (2005).
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is the central concern of domestic intellectual property-and heretofore the
concern of states acting in relative isolation. Now that markets, including
markets for knowledge goods, are transnational and global, that traditional
question is transposed to the family of states. Here, the principle of
territoriality 8-that is, the principle that intellectual property law is
primarily the creation of states and is confined to the borders of states-
induces intellectual property scholars to ask the following central question:
is the sum of the intellectual property systems of heterogeneous states, as
influenced through international intermediation and institutions, enhancing
global welfare or not? The focus is inevitably normative, with some metric
of social welfare serving as the focal point for analysis.9
International relations scholars, by contrast, focus first on process.
They ask why, how, and to what effect nations interact, both directly with
each other, and also through, and with, international institutions.' 0 They
model states as actors, looking inside states to understand how the interests
and values of the state are formed, and looking outside states to understand
how the interests and values of one state interact with, and are influenced
by, the interests and values of other states and people in other states. 1
Of course, substance and process are never far apart. As our
conference participants made clear, intellectual property scholars resort to
procedural analysis to support their normative orientation, just as
international relations scholars resort to substantive analysis as they
appraise international processes. That is what makes this marriage between
the two perspectives such a natural one-the two perspectives cannot be
separated and each reinforces the other. Although the primary interest of
intellectual property scholars is on systems for maximizing the allocation of
resources for the production of knowledge, when they work in the
international sphere, international intellectual property scholars have been
drawn into thinking about how national systems interrelate and how
international institutions affect national systems. Similarly, although the
international relations scholars seek to understand the inter-state and intra-
state forces that shape internationalization, those process concerns are
8 See, e.g., GRAEME B. DINWOODIE, WILLIAM 0. HENNESSEY, AND SHIRA PERLMUTER,
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY 28-34 (2001).
9 See, e.g., Elhanan Helpman, Innovation, Imitation, and Intellectual Property Rights, 61
ECONOMETRICA 1247 (1993) (evaluating welfare effects of international intellectual property
along several dimensions).
10 For international relations perspectives on international intellectual property see SUSAN
K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS (2003) and MICHAEL RYAN, KNOWLEDGE DIPLOMACY: GLOBAL COMPETITION AND
THE POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1958).
11 See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Values and Interests: International
Legalization in the Fight Against Corruption, 31 J. L. STUD. S141 (2002).
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generally grounded on some assumptions, or assertions, about the welfare
impact of various types of interactions.
What is interesting, however, is to trace the ways in which substance
and process interrelate in this setting, and the ways in which scholars from
the different settings trace those relationships. What difference does it
make if one uses process as the handmaiden of normative analysis-
analyzing the normative validity of international law by analyzing the
process by which it was made-or if one uses normative analysis as the
handmaiden of process-analyzing the process by which law is made by
appraising its normative impact?
When we follow this substance/process dichotomy as it was revealed
in the work of the scholars who graced our conference, we can begin to
discern that each analytical perspective advances its claims in the midst of
significant ambiguity-that is, each analytical perspective is built around
assertions or assumptions that are themselves contestable, and that therefore
threaten to upset or undermine the analysis that is based on that perspective.
As we examine these ambiguities, we can see how the ambiguity of one
perspective can be addressed from the perspective offered by the other
field; the resources of one perspective become the means of addressing the
ambiguities of a different perspective. Without multiple perspectives we
are left with ambiguity, but when we bring multiple perspectives to bear we
can begin to address the ambiguities. We cannot, in other words, bring our
topic into full focus without bringing multiple perspectives to bear on the
topic.
1H. The Ambiguities of Cooperation, Power, and Normative Welfare
Let me illustrate this point by concentrating on three analytical
perspectives that drove our conference: the nature of international
cooperation, the role of power in the international system, and the
normative assessment of the appropriate international regime for knowledge
goods. I first examine each analytical perspective and the ambiguity that
arises from that perspective; I then examine how one analytical perspective
might be used to address the ambiguities of a different perspective. My
conclusion is that given the ambiguity of cooperation, the ambiguity of
power, and the ambiguity of normative analysis, no one analytical
perspective can give us a full picture of the way the world works and of the
impact of the way the world works on the welfare of the world.
Triangulation is called for, with the perspectives being combined in a way
that bring each ambiguity into focus, thereby reducing it to the extent
possible. Let me expand on this point by examining the nature of the
ambiguities and how they can be resolved.
2004]
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A. The Ambiguity of Cooperation
International relations scholars work around a large black hole. We
know that states cooperate-that is, that they do things jointly and interact
in ways that change each other's behavior by changing each other's values
and interests. We have rich theories that explain why and how states
cooperate,' 2 how international institutions evolve, 3 how international
institutions, regimes and law affect state behavior, 14 and how transnational
networks-both within' 5 and outside 16 government-affect state behavior.
Yet, we have no good metric for determining whether the gains of that
cooperation are divided equally, or whether, indeed, there are reciprocal
gains at all. Admittedly, we can begin any analysis of cooperation with the
presumption that when states cooperate it is because cooperation improves
the joint welfare of the negotiating states in some way. Why else would
12 See, e.g., Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes
as Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., Cornell
University Press 1983) (articulating regime theory as a theory of cooperation); Jack L.
Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Moral and Legal Rhetoric in International Relations: A
Rationale Choice Perspective, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S115 (2002) (articulating a rational choice
framework for understanding international cooperation); ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER
HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY, 85-109 (1984)
(articulating "neoliberal" theory based on need to overcome bargaining failures); ABRAM
CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 27 (1995) (articulating theory that states gain
power, and therefore sovereignty, by cooperation); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Toward
an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1749 (2003) (seeing the state as
embedded in a social community of states, which binds states in order to reflect shared
values and to empower states); and Oona Hathaway, The Cost of Commitment, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 1821 (2003) (exploring the dynamics of commitment when a country does not receive a
reciprocal benefit from other countries).
13 See generally, Special Issue, The Rational Design of International Institutions, 55 INT.
ORG. 761 (2001).
14 See, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS
(1995) (seeing international cooperation leading to a convergence around norms of fairness);
Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L. J. 2599, 2602
(1997) (emphasizing the way the interaction between states leads to norms that become
internalized into national legal systems), and RICHARD FALK, LAW IN AN EMERGING GLOBAL
VILLAGE: A POST-WESTPHALIAN PERSPECTIVE (1998) (arguing that increased
cosmopolitanism will restructure state interests and therefore the stability of cooperation).
15 ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004) (describing the transnational
networks of government officials that influence state behavior and therefore form a new type
of international governance).
16 See, e.g., GLOBALIZATIONS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: CULTURE, POWER, AND THE
TRANSNATIONAL PUBLIC SPHERE (John A. Guidry et al. eds., 2000); MARGARET E. KECK &
KATHRYN SIKKrNK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS, ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS (1998).
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they cooperate? But cooperate is a tricky term. A person who surrenders
his wallet at gun point is cooperating (in one sense), but we would hardly
view that situation to be one of joint gains (except in the limited sense that
the person surrendering his wallet is better off doing so than being harmed).
In other words, theories of cooperation often assume that the fact that
states cooperate must mean that the cooperation makes both parties better
off, and, as an extension, they often assume that both parties are better off
by the same amount of welfare. However, we cannot assume the welfare
effects of cooperation. There is no a priori way of measuring the welfare
effects of cooperation from the fact that states have signed a treaty or set up
an international institution or otherwise changed their behavior in response
to stimuli provided by other states.1 7  There are enough instances of
redistributive cooperation--cooperation that, because it results from power,
yields either asymmetric or no joint gainsl -to make us wary of simply
assuming that cooperation enhances welfare. The fact that states
"cooperate" does not necessarily translate into joint gains, and it certainly
does not necessarily mean that gains are jointly divided in a way that would
meet a common standard of fairness.
What international relations theorists therefore desperately need is a
metric for distinguishing "good" cooperation from "bad" cooperation, both
to distinguish instances of joint welfare gains from instances of coercion,
and also to determine whether welfare gains are equally divided, and
whether it matters. Without such a metric, the cooperation that appears to
be welfare enhancing, and therefore stable, may in fact be welfare
decreasing and unstable.' 9
17 Analysts make this point implicitly when they suggest that we cannot understand, or
evaluate, international regimes without understanding the power that led to those regimes.
See, e.g., Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based
Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, 56 INT'L ORG. 339 (2002), and Richard H.
Steinberg, Great Power Management of the World Trading System: A Transatlantic Strategy
for Liberal Mutilateralism, 29 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 205 (1998). One of our conference
participants has done an especially effective job of exploring the imbalance in various forms
of power that are embedded in the WTO system. See, e.g., Gregory Shaffer, Recognizing
Public Goods in WTO Dispute Settlement : Who Participates? Who Decides?, 7 J.INT'L
ECON. L. 459 (2004) (showing how power is reflected in the way countries use the dispute
resolution process); Gregory C. Shaffer, The Nexus of Law and Politics: The WTO's
Committee on Trade and Environment, in THE GREENING OF TRADE LAW, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE ORGANIZATIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES (Richard H. Steinberg ed., 2002). See
also, Peter Drahos, When the Weak Bargain with the Strong: Negotiations in the World
Trade Organization, 8 INT'L NEGOTIATION 79 (2003).
18 See, e.g., Thomas Oatley and Robert Nabors, Redistributive Cooperation: Market
Failure, Wealth Transfers, and the Basle Accord, 52. INT'L ORG. 35 (1998).
19 We can, in other words, evaluate any form of cooperation either on the ground that the
cooperation improves, or fails to improve, some normative measure of welfare, or on the
ground that the cooperation is destabilizing rather than stabilizing. Often cooperation that
2004]
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There are, of course, two ways of filling the black hole left by the
unsupported assumption that joint activity yields joint and symmetrical
gains. One way is to study directly the power relationships that lead to
cooperation and to analyze cooperation in terms of the power that shaped
the cooperation. Because the division of gains from cooperation will
reflect the relative power of the bargainers, if a metric existed for
understanding the relative power of states we would have a basis for
making a judgment about how the gains from cooperation are divided. For
example, if the bargaining power of the states in a negotiation is evenly
distributed, we might justifiably assume that each party will insist on a
roughly equal division of the benefits of cooperation. If, by contrast, we
have a David negotiating with a Goliath, we can assume that the gains will
be distributed in accordance with their relative strengths. Yet, as I will
make clear in a minute, power is itself an ambiguous concept, not only
because it is difficult to measure, but also because it can be used for both
good and evil.
If we cannot resolve the ambiguity of cooperation by examining the
nature of the power relationships that led to the cooperation, perhaps we
could resort to the second method of helping to address the ambiguity-that
is, we might develop a metric for measuring the normative welfare outcome
of any cooperation. If we had such a metric, we could distinguish and
evaluate various states of cooperation; some cooperation would be found to
"unfairly" divide the gains of cooperation (as defined by our normative
metric) and others would not. Yet, developing such a normative metric is
also fraught with ambiguity, as we shall see shortly, and that ambiguity
identifies another analytical gap that must be filled. We therefore need to
understand both the ambiguity of power and the ambiguity of normative
analysis in order to understand how we might evaluate cooperative
solutions in a more comprehensive way, and to see how we might use our
lenses of cooperation, power, and normative analysis to triangulate
international intellectual property.
B. The Ambiguity of Power
As I have said, if we had a good metric for measuring the impact of
power on cooperation, we might address the ambiguity of cooperation by
trying to determine the ways in which the exercise of power has influenced
the cooperation. If cooperation resulted from evenly distributed bargaining
power we could assume that the benefits of cooperation were roughly
evenly divided; if cooperation were achieved at the point of a gun, we could
normatively reduces welfare will be destabilizing for that reason. But even cooperative
systems that improve the welfare of all parties may prove to be unstable if the distribution of
gains makes a member of the system so resentful that the member defects from the regime
(either explicitly of implicitly).
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assume that the benefits were not evenly divided. Aside from the
difficulty20-some would say impossibility---of developing such a metric,
21
even when power is used there is an ambiguity inherent in the use of
power-an ambiguity that ran throughout our conference. The ambiguity
of power is that power can be exercised for good as well as for evil. The
fact that power is exercised appears to be troubling by itself-especially for
those who do not have it-but if it is wielded for good rather than for ill, it
is objectionable only if process trumps substance. Both governance in
general and the rule of law in particular represent exercises of power, and
are not subject to criticism for that reason alone. A system with an
altruistic Hegemon might be preferable to a system with widely dispersed,
but diabolical, power. Power is not, by itself, the problem.
In order to incorporate effectively a consideration of power into the
analytics of cooperation we must overcome three obstacles. The first
obstacle, already alluded to, is to define an analytics of power that allows us
to determine whether power has been used and what its effects are. Power
is easy to assert, but hard to measure. We know that states search for power
during negotiations, either by building coalitions or breaking coalitions,
either by enhancing their information or belittling other's information, and
by both bluff and threat. But at the end of the day we have no basis for
measuring the impact of power on the negotiations. Even a David can best
a Goliath by exploiting a weakness.
Moreover, even if we had appropriate analytical tools for the task of
tracing the effect of power on outcomes, we would also have to determine
when the use of power is for good, rather than for ill. As Ruth Okediji
reminded us at the conference, under the current international system, we
entrust the welfare of people to states. If states are dysfunctional, then
intervention that overcomes that dysfunction may make people better off
rather than worse. Again, there are enough instances of power being used
20 The difficulty of distinguishing between cooperation that results from power and
cooperation that does not is widely embedded in the literature about globalization. See, e.g.,
ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE, ALBERT BRESSAND & TAKATOSHI ITO, A VISION FOR THE WORLD
ECONOMY: OPENNESS, DIVERSITY AND COHESION, 28-43 (1996) (distinguishing "imperial
harmonization" from "competitive convergence").
21 We understand, of course, that power in a cooperative setting depends on the options
that a state has if it decides not to cooperate; the more options a state has to achieve its goals
in a non-cooperative way, the more credible are its threats to avoid, or defect from,
cooperation. Accordingly, alternatives are the source of bargaining power because they
frame the importance of cooperation to the state. Yet, it is never clear what weight particular
options have as a source of leverage in negotiations. Even a state with many options will
have a particularized need that it cannot meet in any other way. Moreover, if a state
misunderstands its options, it may choose non-cooperative solutions that make it worse off.
Bargaining partners that understand this will not be influenced by the options a state thinks
that it has.
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for good that we should be wary of any analysis that does not differentiate
the use of power from the misuse of power.
Yet, even if we can discern the "good" use of power from the "bad"
use of power, we face a third difficulty in developing an analytics of
power-namely, that even if power is exercised to do substantive good
unambiguously, there may still be instances where the damage done to
process values by the use of power outweighs the normative good that the
power does. Sometimes process values trump normative values because
achieving legitimate ends by illegitimate means may so destabilize a social
system as to lead, ultimately, to less welfare rather than more. The use of
power implicates both normative and process values, and we cannot praise
power for its normative results without also examining the impact of the use
of power on process values. This requires that we have a way of
understanding how process values enter into the utility functions of the
states.
Accordingly, the ambiguity of power presents significant difficulties
for any approach that seeks to overcome the ambiguity of cooperation by
resorting to a direct assessment of the impact of power on the nature of
cooperation. We might turn to normative analysis to fill the gap, but here
too we find substantial ambiguities that complicate the analysis.
C. The Ambiguity of Normative Analysis
In an ideal world, we could use normative analysis to help us resolve
the ambiguities of cooperation and power. Normative intellectual property
analysis would be able to tell us whether a system of norm creation is used
for good or for ill based on an analysis that measures the values that are
important to a particular vision of human welfare-for example on the
incentives for creating, and gaining access to, new knowledge. Of course,
we would have to specify and defend a conception of human welfare, and
that issue is deeply contestable, 2 but in principle if we could specify a
22 1 have already referred to the difference between a rights based, deontological approach
to intellectual property and an instrumentalist, consequentialist approach, see supra, note 4.
The deontological approaches to intellectual property are derived from Lockean property
theory, as applied in various theories of individual rights. It is very much associated with the
philosophy of Robert Nozick See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 178-182
(1974). Among the most noteworthy deontological approaches to general welfare analysis is
that of John Rawls, where the distributional aspects of human welfare predominate. JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 245-248 (1999). Among consequentialist theories, the
maximization of wealth often serves as a measure of human welfare, but wider conceptions
of human welfare, including distributional consequences, are possible through a
consequentialist approach. Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE
21-23 (2002), (suggesting that social welfare can take into account one person's interest in
the welfare of others, and thus incorporate fairness values as one of the consequences that
matters). See also, AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (2000) (suggesting that
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metric for measuring human welfare we would be able to trace the impact
of any legal regime on that metric, and that would help us to assess and
evaluate the nature of both cooperation and power. For example, if we
specified that the welfare effects of any international regime must be evenly
shared among all countries, we could look at the welfare effects of any
regime and then evaluate the nature of the cooperation and the power that
underlies that regime. A regime that yields joint gains, evenly distributed,
would allow us to infer that the cooperation was joint-benefit maximizing
and that it was not influenced by power. By contrast, a regime that yielded
asymmetrical gains or even one-sided gains would be seen to have the
indicia of redistributive cooperation. Working backwards we could then
identify which aspects of cooperation and which aspects of the use of power
seem to be causal indicators of the outcome that either conforms to, or
detracts from, our specified notion of welfare.
Not surprisingly, we do not live in this ideal world of normative
acuity. Several of the problems are well known-the two most prominent
ones being the difficulty of defining and then measuring welfare. We were
reminded at several points in the conference of the substantial debate over
the precise welfare effects that attend any change in intellectual property
laws. In addition, we agreed that debates about the definition and
measurement of the welfare effects of intellectual property are rife, even in
domestic intellectual property systems. These ambiguities are augmented
when we are dealing with an international, rather than a national, system.
The general problems involved in defining the welfare effects of national
intellectual property policy are exacerbated in the international field by the
distortions that the international system brings to intellectual property
lawmaking. Whatever the precise shape for intellectual property that is best
for a state when it thinks of its welfare in isolation, when that state
considers its position on international intellectual property law, the state's
welfare calculus changes. The fact is that when intellectual property is
projected into the international field, the search for balance between
incentives and access yields to either the search for wealth (for intellectual
property exporters) or the search for access (for intellectual property
importers), and any national interest in a balanced regime internally gives
way to an interest in an external regime that is imbalanced-one that will
therefore be imbalanced to meet the interests of the states with the most
bargaining power.23
In other words, international intellectual property regimes are not
made through a search for the right balance between incentives and access
because the states that make the regime are not, individually, looking for
maximizing individual potential could fruitfully bridge the gap between consequentialist and
deontological approaches).
23 See Peter M. Gerhart, Why Lawmaking for Global Intellectual Property is Unbalanced,
22 E.I.P.R. 309 (2000).
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that balance in the international sphere. Each state is looking for an
international regime that reflects that state's interests. Whether that results
in an international system that is "balanced" in some sense of global
welfare is not a reflection on what the parties are searching for individually,
but simply of the happenstance that the negotiating power of the states is
distributed in a way that happens, almost by coincidence, to reach that
result.
In any event, there is simply no metric for determining whether the
global welfare delivered by an international system is optimal. It is difficult
enough to aggregate the different preferences within a state to determine
what is in a state's interest, and even more difficult to determine how
appropriately to compare the welfare of one state with that of another state.
Lacking such a metric, even intellectual property scholars are forced to
resort to an analysis of the process by which international intellectual
property is made in order to make some judgments about the substantive
wisdom of the laws that are evolving. The ambiguities of normative
analysis require us to resort to process analysis, and therefore to resort
either to the analytics of cooperation or the analytics of power.
In other words, our conference traced three broad focal points for
understanding the future of international intellectual property: theories of
cooperation, theories of power, and theories of normative welfare. Any one
of these themes tells us something about the future of intellectual property,
but each theme needs to be supplemented by at least one of the other
themes in order to provide a meaningful contribution to our understanding
of the forces that shape the international regimes. Analysts who start from
the lens of cooperation can say that because the international system
reflects a cooperative outcome, it must increase global welfare, but they
cannot say that with confidence unless they can also rule out the possibility
(based on the lens of power) that the cooperation was really coerced, or
redistributive, or (alternatively) unless they can provide a metric of the
normative welfare effects of the cooperation that is widely accepted.
Analysts who start from the lens of power can portray the international
intellectual property regime as problematic because it is derived from an
imbalance of negotiating power, but they cannot say anything meaningful
about the international system unless they can also argue (from the
normative perspective) that the use of power has reduced (rather than
improved) global welfare, or subverted systemic values in a meaningful
way. Finally, analysts who focus first on the normative welfare impacts of
intellectual property regimes are unable to say anything meaningful about
the international system unless they have a way of comparing, on the one
hand, the welfare of countries that gain from international intellectual
property with, on the other hand, the welfare of countries that lose from
international intellectual property. That can best be done by examining
whether the development of international law reflects cooperative power or
coercive power.
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Not surprisingly, then, scholars approaching international intellectual
property must triangulate using a mix of cooperation theory, power theory,
and normative theory; each with its own limitations, but each bringing
something valuable to help address the ambiguities in other approaches.
III. Realism, Liberalism, and Distributive Values
Before summarizing how the individual papers in this symposium
relate to this triangulation, we can also profit by looking more intensely at
pairs of this triumvirate. Our conference also suggested interesting insights
that come about if we look more intensely at the combination of just two of
the three focal points, one with a lesson for international relations scholars
and the other with a lesson for intellectual property scholars. In particular,
the conference suggested that by putting the focal point of cooperation
together with the focal point of power we can see the need to merge, within
the umbrella of international relations theory, the perspectives of liberalism
with the perspective of realism. And when we put together the focal point
of power with the focal point of normative welfare, we can see the need to
include distributive concerns explicitly in our analysis of the normative
impact of international intellectual property law. Let me briefly summarize
these points.
A. The Merger of Liberalism and Realism: The Theory of
Distributive Cooperation
Traditionally, international relations theorists have seen themselves as
following either liberal or realist approaches to international affairs; a
division that roughly mirrors the contrast between the theories of
cooperation and theories of power that I outlined above. International
relations scholars in the liberal tradition have worked out the theory and
implications of international cooperation, without having to worry about the
normative impact of the cooperation, while realists think of the
international system in terms of power, without paying much attention to
how the cooperation that results from the power changes the power
relationships. In this stylized view, liberalists concentrate on the analytics
of cooperation, working out how and why states cooperate, form
international institutions, and subject themselves to the constraints and
opportunities of the international regime. They essentially work out the
logic of collective action among states. Their hope is that international
cooperation, by channeling rivalry into accepted boundaries with effective
dispute resolution, will result in a stable system where war is unlikely.
Realists, on the other hand, work out the analytics of power. Their
focus-and the endgame of the realist logic-is that what matters to a state
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is relative power-that is, a state's power relative to other states.24 For
realists, cooperation is but an expression of power and is inherently
unstable because when cooperation threatens the power relationships that
are important to states, the cooperation will end.
It is common to assume that realists and liberalists could not coexist,
and analysts in the two traditions are largely viewed to present competing
theories of international relations. To a realist, international cooperation
does not matter because it is always subservient to state interest, which
always seeks to enhance a state's relative power. In the liberal tradition,
cooperation matters because cooperation yields joint gains, and the search
for joint gains can overcome a state's interest in relative power by changing
the state's perception of its security interests.
But when we put the perspective of cooperation together with the
perspective of power that arose from our conference, we can suggest that
the logic of realism was never antagonistic to cooperation. Realism did not
deny the ability of states to make treaties, to ease frictions, and to change
their behavior in response to the behavioral changes in other states. To
realists, cooperation is always possible and always in a state's interests-
with one important proviso: the cooperation has to preserve, or increase, the
relative power of the dominant players in order to give them the sense of
security they need. In the realist view, a dominant state would always
cooperate to improve the welfare of another state, provided only that it
would gain by that cooperation more than the other state did-that is, as
long as the cooperation secured, or enhanced, its relative power.
Naturally, when gains are evenly divided between a powerful and a
powerless state, the powerless state gains relatively more than the powerful
state. That will not, however, keep the logic of realism from allowing the
powerful state to cooperate. In any dynamic system, the power of the
Hegemon is constantly eroding (unless it is maintained by force).
Accordingly, the powerful state will lose relative power if it does not
cooperate; convergence is natural in a world where small states need to
increase their power in order to protect their security. Accordingly, even a
powerful state is faced with the possibility of losing its power if it does not
cooperate with others. It will therefore cooperate in a way that slows down
the natural erosion of its power, looking at that gain as an additional gain of
cooperation.
Under this scenario, a powerful state will gain from cooperation in two
ways: from the direct benefits of the cooperation and from slowing down
the process through which it loses power. These gains may well make the
relative gains from cooperation greater for the powerful country, even if the
direct gains of cooperation are evenly divided.
24 See, e.g., KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979); JOHN J.
MEARSHEIMER, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS 29-30 (2001); John J.
Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, 19 INT'L SEC. 5 (1995).
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International intellectual property is important for international
relations theory precisely because it demonstrates that cooperation can
follow realist logic. For example, the United States faces significant
economic competition and depletion of relative power from Europe, Japan,
and emerging markets, yet, by directing cooperation toward knowledge
goods-particularly those in which the United States has a competitive
advantage-it can project its economic dominance longer than if there were
no cooperation in knowledge goods. One can easily support the hypothesis
that cooperation over international intellectual property results from the
search for benefits that increase the power of the powerful states relative to
states without power. Under this hypothesis, the United States is following
realist logic when it advances the TRIPS agenda or the TRIPS plus agenda,
for it is working to secure its relative benefits from intellectual property,
and therefore securing its relative power and security in an area of great
strategic importance (knowledge goods) and great wealth producing
importance (revenues from knowledge goods). International intellectual
property allows us to see that the logic of cooperation does not necessarily
deny the logic of realism.
Liberalism and realism can therefore be seen as complimentary, rather
than competing, theories; liberal theory notes the benefits of cooperation,
while realist theory shows the limits of cooperation in overcoming the need
to project and use power in the state interest.25 In the liberal tradition-the
happy face of globalization-the cooperation produces joint gains that
make all states better off. In the realist tradition, the cooperation makes the
dominant players better off faster than the less dominant players, or reduces
the erosion of their dominance, and therefore serves the interests of the
dominant players primarily. The dominant players, of course, write the
ideology of post Cold War cooperation. Naturally, they emphasize the joint
and reciprocal gains from cooperation. But the possible complimentarity of
realism and liberalism requires that we work out the analytics of power-
that is, a metric for determining when the gains from cooperation are jointly
shared (the pathology of cooperation) and when they are skewed in favor of
one party over another (the pathology of power). We must have models
that help us differentiate skewed gains from joint gains.
B. Distributive Aspects of Normative Welfare
Just as we gain insight by looking at the relationship between
cooperation and power, so too do we gain insight when we look at the
relationship between power and normative welfare. What becomes clear
when we contemplate international intellectual property is the need to make
25 A similar point is made in Jonathan D. Greenberg, Does Power Trump Law?, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 1789, 1818 (2003) (noting the value of realist perspectives in reminding us that
stable cooperative systems are nonetheless fragile).
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sure that the design of international intellectual property regimes takes into
account not only the efficiency gains from intellectual property regimes but
also how those efficiency gains are distributed. The need to consider
deliberately the distributional values that are implicated by the system
becomes an important part of institutional design.
As I have commented elsewhere, when we think of the welfare aspects
of intellectual property we normally do not think of the distributive
dimension-that is, we do not think about how the gains and losses from
policy design are distributed.26 This is because we normally think of
normative welfare within a country, where we can rely on the tax and spend
power of government to address the distributive values that cannot be
reached through the intellectual property system. If some people are too
poor to have access to essential patented medicines, for example, the
government can subsidize their purchase in order to provide access that the
intellectual property system would otherwise deny. Moreover, some
distributional values are embedded (almost invisibly) in those parts of
intellectual property doctrine that provide access to those who would
otherwise be hard pressed to pay for the property.27
In the international system, however, the institutional infrastructure
for making such distributive decisions is missing; we have no institutional
structure for making the welfare decisions that determine, across states,
whether and how those who gain from a particular policy should
compensate those who lose from the policy. Accordingly, in the
international system, distributive values must be embedded in the
international intellectual property system itself, through the provisions of
intellectual property systems that provide for fair use or other access
rights--otherwise these values will be ignored. Simply put, in the
international arena, there is no good mechanism for taking into account the
inability of poor countries to pay for the knowledge goods that they need in
order to enhance their own welfare, and if distributional goals are to have
any salience, the goals must be forthrightly addressed.
Indeed, as I made clear above, the configuration of the international
lawmaking system is biased against distributive values. The United States
negotiates out of its interest as it defines that interest, and there is no a
priori reason why the United States should contemplate the impact of
international policy on the poor in other countries when it decides what its
interests are and how it should use its influence to shape international
26 Peter M. Gerhart, Distributional Values and Institutional Design in the Provision of
Global Public Goods, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,
supra note 3.
27 For example, we can see distributional values at work in the first sale doctrine, which
allows one who owns a copyrighted product to loan it to others-thereby making libraries
possible. Libraries, in turn, serve as important sources of access for those who would
otherwise not be able to pay for the copyrighted material.
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policy. After all, the poor are not in the United States, so they do not make
up a part of the polity that defines, through democratic representation, the
United States' interest. The United States incorporates the interests of the
poor abroad only when the interests of the poor become the interests of the
United States, either because people within the United States represent the
interests of these poor individuals or because helping the poor is in the
interest of the United States. And, because bargaining power at the WTO is
determined by the relative economic strength of each country, the poorest
countries do not have the power to bargain to insure that access to
knowledge goods is given sufficient priority.
The lesson for intellectual property scholars is clear. In the
international arena, the distributive values that are likely to be affected by
the design of the international intellectual property system must be
explicitly identified and considered in the design of the system; they cannot
be left to other institutional mechanisms.
IV. This Symposium Issue
Thus far, I have referred to the general themes that came out of our
conference, presenting my interpretation, after reflection, of the many
splendid contributions that went into the conference. Let me now move
from the general to the particular, looking at the individual contributions to
the conference that generated these reflections. In what way did the
individual excellence of each of our participants contribute to and reinforce
this particular understanding of the intersection between international
relations theory and international intellectual property?
George Downs and Eyal Benvenisti, in their article Distributive
Politics and International Institutions: The Case of Drugs, adopt the
perspective of power, and point out that both international law and
behavioral norms that are embedded in regimes are the product of inter-
state politics and are therefore the projection of power. Accordingly, we
cannot fully understand either international law or international regimes if
we do not see them as an exercise of power by states. Their analysis
supports the notion that cooperation through either law or through regimes
can be fully understood only by finding a way of assessing the power that
underlies, and therefore continues to influence, the regime. Because they
are conscious that power is neither one-dimensional nor directly
measurable, professors Downs and Benvenisti seek a proxy measure that
will help us understand the power that exists in the international system,
and they come up with an ingenious proxy. By focusing on a country's
ability to negotiate for lower prices on individual drugs when they buy
directly from drug companies, they are able to observe a market price that
reflects power-that is, a measure of the normative effects of having (or not
having) power.
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Peter Drahos, in his article Securing the Future of Intellectual
Property: Intellectual Property Owners and their Nodally Coordinated
Enforcement Pyramid, also approaches his subject from the perspective of
power, but his concern is to show how a state with a strong interest in the
foreign enforcement of intellectual property law is likely to organize itself,
internally and with respect to the foreign country, to maximize the
projection of its power. He thus explains why a powerful country has an
interest in how other countries enforce intellectual property rights, how
such a country sifts through and evaluates the variety of its domestic
interests and overseas opportunities, and how a country focuses that interest
in its relationships with other countries. His assumption is that countries
that are strong intellectual property producers have the interest and
incentive to seek stronger overseas enforcement of their rights. Such a
country, however, needs a process for choosing which domestic interests to
champion, and Professor Drahos uses a model of nodal governance to
understand that process. Such a country also needs a process of negotiating
with foreign countries to encourage their intellectual property vigilance, and
Professor Drahos uses the model of enforcement pyramids to show how a
country projects its power. Finally, such a country needs a process for
anticipating and responding to attempts by the foreign country to change
the relative balance of power, and Professor Drahos uses the theory of
forum shifting to show how a country can change the mix of carrots and
sticks that it uses by negotiating in various forums and across subject matter
to keep coalitions from forming.
Professor Carlos Correa, in his article Bilateralism in Intellectual
Property: Defeating the WTO System for Access to Medicines, follows up
on this general line of analysis with a more particularized examination of
forum shifting, looking at how the United States has used negotiations in
the context of the Central American Free Trade Agreement to realign the
normative commitments of the Central American countries to intellectual
property, resulting in a new TRIPS-plus regime. He reviews in great detail
the provisions in CAFTA that result in a TRIPS-plus regime, but then
notices a curious fact-that in some respects the negotiation may also lead
to enhanced intellectual property protection in the United States, suggesting
that intellectual property owners in the United States are successfully able
to use international negotiations to increase their power within the United
States. This leads to the possibility of a continuing upward ratcheting of
global intellectual property rights; as the value to United States rights
holders increases, the incentive on the United States to seek to profit from
that value abroad also increases, inducing the United States to seek even
higher standards in the future.
Building on the insight that national intellectual property systems will
increasingly be shaped by international developments, professors
Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss continue their groundbreaking exploration of
whether life under the TRIPS regime may preclude a country from
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fashioning the balance between incentive and access that achieves their
normative goals and reflects their unique conditions.28 In their article
TRIPS and the Dynamics of Intellectual Property Lawmaking, they explore
an important aspect of the neo-federalism that is emerging under TRIPS-
whether and to what extent international intellectual property law under
TRIPS will inhibit a country from adjusting domestic intellectual property
rights along different dimensions, creating greater protections along some
dimensions while reducing protection along others. Their theme-that
WTO dispute resolution must recognize the political realities within states,
and not view legislation as a compilation of discrete mandates subject to
individual review-suggests that normative welfare issues at the state level
cannot all be solved through an international template, and that those
interpreting the global obligations should be sensitive to the local context in
which balances are struck.
Laurence Helfer, in his paper entitled Mediating Interactions in an
Expanding International Intellectual Property Regime, moves in a
complimentary direction by showing how our understanding of regime
theory can be deepened if we comprehend how states use regimes to
increase their power or decrease the power of those with whom they
negotiate. Of the many important points that he makes in this and an earlier
paper on regime theory,29 two stand out in terms of the themes that I have
drawn from our conference. The first is that states can move (or try to
move) subject matter to new regimes as a way of changing the nature of the
norms that are taken into account in thinking about the topic. Whereas
TRIPS might be heavily weighted toward the incentive side of the balance
(reflecting its origin in the industrial countries), by shifting subject matter to
regimes that are more sensitive to distributional values (such as public
health), countries may be able to restore some balance between incentive
and access, and thus between efficiency values and distributional fairness.
Moreover, his paper makes clear that the decision to treat intellectual
property as a subject matter for international negotiations, separate and
apart from all the subject matter for which it has consequences (such as
health, local culture, and education) was a "framing decision" that itself
reflects the interests and values of the countries that have the power to
frame issues in international negotiations. He successfully shows that
regime theory rebuts the realist notion that international norms do not
matter. He does not deny, however, the realist assumption that the search
for relative power is one of the driving forces behind regimes and regime
change.
28 There earlier work was Graeme B. Dinwoodie and Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss,
International Intellectual Property Law and the Public Domain of Science, 7 J. INT'L ECON.
L. 431 (2004).
29 Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of
International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2004).
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V. Conclusion
Our conference demonstrated why international intellectual property
provides such a rich lens through which to view international relations.
International intellectual property illustrates the stark contrast between the
"have" states and the "have not" states. It provides a seemingly endless
puzzle of causality-whether the "have not" states are poor because they
have not had intellectual property systems or, on the other hand, whether
they have not had intellectual property systems because they are poor. It
focuses on important questions about the role of power in the international
system and the resulting welfare effects when that power is used.
International intellectual property gets each state deeply involved in the
internal domestic policy of other states, and it does so in ways that apply
uniquely to the forms of rights protected in intellectual property. Because
international intellectual property harnesses the dispute resolution
provisions of the WTO, it requires WTO members to honor the rule of law
with respect to these rights, and makes intellectual property rights a
legitimate focus of bilateral and regional negotiations, bringing
international law into the core of state governance as it has never been
before.
We hope that the papers presented in this symposium issue
successfully present the range of thought that is important to understanding
this new form of international cooperation and rivalry.
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